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Abstract: The importance of water security has gained prominence on the international 
water agenda, but the focus seems to be directed towards water demand. An essential 
element of water security is the functioning of public organizations responsible for water 
supply through direct and indirect security approaches. Despite this, there has been a 
tendency to overlook the water security strategies of these organizations as well as 
constraints on their operation. This paper discusses the critical role of water supply in 
achieving sustainable water security and presents two case studies from Central Asia on the 
management of water supply for irrigated agriculture. The analysis concludes that existing 
water supply bureaucracies need to be revitalized to effectively address key challenges in 
water security. 
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Since the 1990s, water infrastructure security and security of water supply became important topics 
with regards to conflict [1] and terrorism [2,3] specifically related to water. Today, water security is 
even more dominant on the agenda of the international water community and three international 
organizations (the Global Water Partnership, the United Nations University, and the International Water 
Management Institute) adopted the term as a guiding framework. Current water security definitions refer to 
key demands or objectives of users and the ecosystem in a changing environment [4,5]. In addition to this 
global focus on water security, the water, energy and food nexus builds around water security 
objectives [6]. With the emphasis put on these objectives, more traditional approaches to water supply 
security, such as direct and indirect water security measures, are omitted. 
An important factor of indirect water security is infrastructure. Infrastructure development for 
irrigated agriculture had its peak in the late 1970s (measured by World Bank lending) and was from 
then on a decline [7]. Today, mainly because of population pressure, new water infrastructure 
development is again on the agenda [8]. New large scale water infrastructure could also be an 
important aspect of polycentric water management within basins [9,10]. Some of the past investments 
in large scale water infrastructure are based on the fragmentation of former colonies and new national 
water security approaches, such as the construction of link-canals in the Indus Basin in Pakistan [11]. 
This paper contributes to the literature on indirect water security approaches in a recently fragmented 
basin, the Syr Darya in Central Asia. International literature on water security in the Syr Darya Basin 
often focuses on large transboundary infrastructure such as the Toktogul and Kayrakum reservoirs in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, respectively, as well as the planned new Kambarata 1 and 2 reservoirs in 
Kyrgyzstan. The prominent nature of the water-energy nexus in large water infrastructures, such as in 
the Syr Darya Basin, has also brought a focus on related energy security [12,13]. Hence, in the  
Syr Darya Basin, water and energy security focus mainly on the main river as well as its larger 
reservoirs. This focus ignores important aspects of historical design. The Soviet Union designed and 
planned water management at basin level as well as Smaller Transboundary Tributaries (STTs) and 
smaller infrastructure such as main canals, reservoirs or pump station schemes [14–17]. 
Direct water security in large scale irrigation systems has been the responsibility of irrigation 
bureaucracies in the past [18,19]. However, with the exception of some early experiences, Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT) became a national strategy in most developing countries in the 1980s and 
1990s [20]. IMT shifts the responsibility of direct water security from the government to the users, 
organized in newly created Water User Associations (WUAs). While IMT and WUAs have been in the 
past widely promoted [21,22], more recently there have been doubts [23,24]. With the focus on IMT 
the lower level bureaucracy is “handed over” [25,26] and the higher level bureaucracy focuses on other 
functions or focuses only on the higher level like basin management [27]. Here, a case study is 
presented on partial IMT in one province of Uzbekistan. When focusing on water security for irrigated 
agriculture within Uzbekistan, so far the emphasis has been on the introduction of winter wheat (as 
policy to increase food security) and therefore the reduction of irrigated area under cotton [28,29] as 
well as creating WUAs [30,31]. The water supply organizations, the irrigation departments, have 
received little international attention, although they were incorporated in some donor projects. 
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This paper discusses both indirect and direct water supply security measures in irrigated agriculture 
by drawing from evidence from the Syr Darya basin and Ferghana Province, Uzbekistan. The focus on 
water supply, rather than on water demand security, is meant to draw attention to the way in which 
water management, with particular focus on irrigated agriculture, was organized. This focus on past 
water supply security approaches attempts to challenge the current focus of the international research 
community on basins and large infrastructure [12,13]. This paper also points out weaknesses in the 
current promotion of IMT especially at the main canal level–which shifts water supply security from 
the government to the water users for agricultural water uses [32,33]. 
The presented case study is structured into two sections. The data for the first section is based on a 
literature review and interviews with a key informer of the Syr Darya basin water organization (BWO) 
in 2014. The data presented in the second section is based on archival research of annual reports of the 
Ferghana Province Irrigation Department in Uzbekistan. The annual reports studied cover a period 
from 1978 up to 2010. Key informers of the Ferghana and Andijan Province Irrigation Departments 
were interviewed regarding verification of reported trends. 
The paper continues with a short framework section on water security. The following case study is 
structured into two sections. The first section focuses on water supply security within the Syr Darya 
and the associated challenges faced by past and current irrigation water management strategies at the 
irrigation district level. The second section focuses on water security approaches within Ferghana 
Province and highlights changing water demands as well as the water security approaches taken so far. 
Within the section, large emphasis is put on the irrigation departments which after Uzbekistan’s 
independence were not incorporated in achieving water security. Each case study is followed by a 
short discussion. A broader discussion follows, highlighting the possibly national as well as 
international reasons for not focusing on water supply organizations, which appear to have become the 
weakest link in water security. The conclusion stresses the need to look at poly-centric water 
management and a refocus on water supply organizations. 
2. Water Security 
As Allouche el al. [34] noticed “historically security has been concerned with safety and therefore 
can be understood as the condition of being protected from, or not exposed to, danger”. Water security 
by the turn of the century focused on these traditional aspects. The security of larger water supply 
infrastructure was voiced in the debate on water wars [1], terrorism [2,3] as well as cyber-attacks [35]. 
While these perceived insecurities have been dismissed, they have also triggered calls for heightened 
security and additional systems of resilience [35,36]. 
More recently, the term water security gained prominence in the international literature from a 
different perspective. UN-water [4] defines water security as “The capacity of a population to safeguard 
sustainable access to adequate quantities of and acceptable quality of water for sustaining livelihoods, 
human well-being, and socio-economic development for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution 
and water-related disasters and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability”.  
The definition mainly focuses on the demand side and objectives of water security. While this broad 
definition of water security focusses on access and is human centered (“capacity of a population”), it 
critically lacks reference to the supply-side of water security. Water supply is vaguely addressed and 
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seems to extend the responsibility of water security to the wider public by making reference to ‘a 
population’. As answer to the current challenge of water security, UN-water [4] calls for “tailored 
policy responses”, human “capacity development” and “improved water governance”. Water service 
providers, their challenges and strategies how to meet water demands are not directly addressed.  
The focus on human “capacity building” seems to neglect the human ingenuity in developing countries 
to cope with water insecurity. As Allouche et al. [34] highlights, “Missing […] is the issue of security 
sought by households in the South, many of whom exist within the vast informal economy, through 
which they survive and cope with external circumstances”. 
Grey and Sadoff [5] define water security as “the availability of an acceptable quantity and quality 
of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems and production, coupled with an acceptable level of  
water-related risks to people, environments and economies. Lautze and Manthrithilake [37] highlight 
that Grey and Sadoff’s “broader treatment of risks strongly suggests inclusion of issues related to water 
for national security or independence”. Sadoff et al. [38], when defining pathways to water security, 
put the emphasis on institutions, information and infrastructure. Sadoff et al. [38] see institutions as 
“formal laws, policies, regulations, and administrative organizations as well as informal networks and 
coalitions”. According to them, institutions incorporate planning, financing, construction, operating, 
supplying, regulating, monitoring, enforcing and insuring. Hence, the main focus is on the public 
sector, and central are water supply organizations. Nevertheless, they [38] highlight the need for  
“a ‘poly-centric’ and multi-level governance system that has been described as an ‘institutional tripod’ 
involving water users, states and markets”. The “institutional tripod” can be criticized from different 
perspectives such as diversity and power inequities of users within sectors [39–43] and competing 
sectors [44–46], market failure and the responsibility of markets for the water crisis [47,48] as well as 
states institutionalizing inequities through water rights reforms [42,49–51]. 
In the global debate on the water, energy and food nexus, although reference is made to water, 
energy and food security, the emphasis for all three is on “access” [6,47]. Different authors have 
highlighted that the water, energy and food nexus is under-conceptualized and that security in one is 
contradicting security of the other parts of the nexus [47,52,53]. Hoff [6] highlights “the emphasis on 
access in these definitions also implies that security is not so much about average (e.g., annual) 
availability of resources, but has to encompass variability and extreme situations such as droughts or 
price shocks, and the resilience of the poor”. Hence, key would be to include in the debate the supply 
side of water security. Instead, Hoff [6] argues that “It is increasingly recognized that conventional 
supply side management is coming to an end in many cases”. Nevertheless, he [6] calls for 
strengthening existing supply side institutions for building “new links across sectors and deal with the 
additional uncertainty, complexity and inertia when integrating a range of sectors and stakeholders”. 
The assumption appears to be, that linking an undefined range of sectors and stakeholders together will 
by itself provide better “access”. Overall, an analysis of existing water supply organizations, and their 
strategies to meet demands or encounter risks, is crucially missing. 
Traditionally, securing water supply focused on planning and construction of large infrastructures to 
be able to capture and store water resources as well as satisfying urban and agricultural needs [54]. 
Infrastructure development was not only seen to increase indirect national water security within 
transboundary basins [11] but also to enable polycentric water management within basins [9,10]. 
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Recently, due to population pressure, but also due to seasonal variability of water, a rising deficit of 
existing water infrastructure has been identified [8,55–57]. 
Looking at water supply security in irrigated agriculture, the aspect of service provision towards the 
users came to the forefront in the 1980s. There was a realization that the gap in maintenance of 
irrigation infrastructure [58] led to a deterioration of water supply services. In addition there was 
recognition of the failure of the irrigation bureaucracy for ensuring equity of water distribution between 
water users [59,60]. Both insights could be attributed to issues regarding the financial security of water 
supply services. However, colonial irrigation systems focused on water supply as well as demands. 
Water control was achieved through different components focusing on water infrastructure, the 
organization providing the service and water demand [61,62]. Looking at past colonial large scale irrigation 
systems Ertsen [18,19] highlights that water supply (infrastructure and organization) as well as demand 
was planned for in the British, French and Dutch irrigation systems. Because of rising political 
pressure, market development and also changes of land ownership and farm sizes the water control 
side in irrigated agriculture disintegrated [63,64]. The rising water demand within the existing irrigated 
area was not met with an expansion of water supply infrastructure and providing more water resources 
or a strengthening of the irrigation bureaucracy controlling the distribution of limited water resources. 
The failure to provide equitable distribution was attributed to the continuation of established control 
practices [65] as well as the overall low salaries of the irrigation bureaucracy and therefore the rise of 
corruption [66]. 
Similarly, in the 1990s with the fall of the iron curtain and with a focus on transitional economies, 
water service provision for urban areas rose high on the development agenda. Again, the focus was on 
maintenance of infrastructure as well as monitoring of water losses [67,68]. The failure of 
strengthening the supply side could be classified as financial insecurity triggering the decline in quality 
of water supply services. 
Rising demands but also a failure to secure and increase water supply triggered the development of 
more resilient water supply systems, i.e., cities established inter-linkages between different sources and 
water storage systems to cope with temporary supply shortages [69]. Similarly, for supporting irrigated 
agriculture, countries or even smaller administrative units (like provinces) established resilient systems 
to cope with international or national transboundary water supply insecurities [11,70–73]. Common in 
all these formal systems of resilience is a diversified access to water resources as well as less reliance 
on one main supply infrastructure. 
Looking at the debates within the water sector, risks to water security have been identified as 
transboundary and inter and intra sectorial competition, water pollution, unsustainable operation and 
maintenance as well as reliance on a single source or supply network. Therefore, water supply security 
could be defined as a resilient system capable of coping with shocks, abuses and threats through direct 
security measures (surveillance and guards) and indirect or more passive measures through increasing 
maintenance and additional or alternative water supply sources, duplication of or less reliance on 
critical infrastructure to better cope with temporary shortages in water source availability as well as 
water rights or allocations to cope with competitions. 
  
Water 2015, 7 4662 
 
 
3. Water Security Approaches in the Syr Darya Basin 
3.1. Geographic Background to the Syr Darya Basin 
The Syr Darya rises in the Tien Shan Mountains of Kyrgyzstan and terminates in the Aral Sea in 
Kazakhstan. It is the longest river in Central Asia, at 3019 km, with a catchment area of 219,000 km2. 
Up to the confluence with the Karadarya (also from Kyrgyzstan) the Syr Darya is called the Naryn.  
The Syr Darya is shared between four riparian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. On its way to the Aral Sea, the Naryn crosses international boundaries between 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan when entering the Ferghana valley and within the valley between 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as the Syr Darya. When leaving the Farghana valley, the Syr Darya enters 
first Uzbekistan and then crosses into Kazakhstan (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The Syr Darya Basin. 
Due to large scale irrigation expansion, facilitated through the construction of multiple use 
reservoirs (Toktogul and Kayrakum), the Syr Darya basin closed in the 1980s [73,74]. The water 
allocation principles developed under the Schemes of Complex Use and Protection of Water Resources 
in the 1970s and early 1980s became the guiding principles of water allocation between the riparian 
states [17]. Later in 1987 the Syr Darya Basin Water Organization (BWO) was established [75]. 
Directly after independence, in 1992, the five Central Asian states came to an agreement to continue 
with these principles. However, while during the time of the Soviet Union the multiple use reservoirs 
operated to facilitate irrigated agriculture, after independence the operation of the reservoirs shifted 
mainly to winter releases for energy production to cover upstream riparian needs. The reason for the 
shift of operation is based on the collapse of existing compensation mechanisms. During the Soviet 
Union era, downstream states compensated for excess electricity produced at the reservoirs during the 
summer, by supplying fossil fuels and electricity during the winter. 
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3.2. The Common Approach to Look at Water Insecurity within the Syr Darya Basin 
After independence the international emphasis on water security within the Syr Darya Basin 
focused on the conflicting interests of upstream hydropower production during the winter and 
downstream water needs for the agricultural sector during the summer. Therefore, the main emphasis 
was on the operation of the Toktogul reservoir and the brokering of an agreement on water and energy 
use in 1998. The agreement was amended to include the Kayrakum reservoir in Tajikistan in 1999. 
According to the agreement, purchases of energy and therefore water allocations from Toktogul are 
determined annually [76–78]. The implementation of the agreement has been seen as problematic in 
reference to water delivery to Kazakhstan [79,80] and as generally failed because of the late signing of 
annual bilateral agreements [78]. Overall, the primary focus of the international attempts to foster water 
security focused on the infrastructure controlling the main stem of the Syr Darya Basin, the Naryn, 
only [81]. However, the Naryn supplies about 40 percent (14.5 km3) of the average annual flow of the 
Syr Darya River (37.2 km3) only [81]. The focus on the Naryn River and the Toktogul reservoir 
assumed that basin management was the overarching principle. In addition, the agreement focused on 
national levels and did not incorporate Tajikistan as downstream water user [15]. 
3.3. Water Insecurity at the Meso-Level: Irrigation Districts and Within 
Other research highlights that within the Syr Darya Basin, water management was organized 
according to “water-use regions” or “irrigation districts”, which in some cases even crossed republican 
boundaries [82–84]. Within the Syr Darya Basin there were six irrigation districts during the Soviet 
era, these were: Upper Naryn, Ferghana Valley, Chirchik-Akhangaran-Keles (Chakir), Midstream,  
Arys-Turkestan (Artur) and Downstream (Figure 2). Three of these irrigation districts were 
transboundary: the Ferghana Valley irrigation district incorporated irrigated areas within the valley from 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; Chakir incorporated irrigated areas of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan; and Mid-stream incorporated irrigated areas from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
 
Figure 2. Irrigation districts in the Syr Darya Basin. 
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Irrigation districts can be categorized into different groups with focus on the utilization of water 
sources, having access to alternative resources, and capturing winter flow (Table 1). The implication of 
former management according to irrigation districts is that the past system focused on poly-centric [9] 
and not basin-level water management and therefore crafted poly-centric water security approaches 
(storage and reliance on multiple sources). Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of independent states, as well as the shift of operation of the larger Toktogul reservoir in 
Kyrgyzstan did not create water insecurity for the whole basin, but created water insecurity for 
individual irrigation districts or parts of them. 
Table 1. Features of irrigation districts (Source: adapted from [84,85]. 
Irrigation 
District 
Source (km3) Storage (km3) Republic 
Irrigated Land 
(1000 ha) 
Total Water Use 
(km3/year) 




Toktogul: Total Storage 
(TS)-19.4 Active Storage 
(AS)-14.0 
Uzbek SSR 409.8 4.69 
Tajik SSR 97.7 1.36 
Kyrgyz SSR 22.5 0.74 
Karadarya (3.9); Small 
Transboundary Tributaries 
(STT) (total 7.8) 




Uzbek SSR 471.7 5.75 
Kyrgyz SSR 293.7 3.21 
Tajik SSR 30.5 0.23 
Chakir 
Chirchik (7.8);  
Akhangaran (0.7);  
Keles (0.3) 
Charvak: TS-2.0; AS-1.6 
Uzbek SSR 347.2 3.43 
Kyrgyz SSR 9.5 0.04 
Kazakh SSR 89 0.89 
Mid-stream 
Main stem 
Kayrakum: TS-4.0;  
AS-2.6  
Farkhad TS-0.15 
Uzbek SSR 629.7 7.19 
Tajik SSR 87.6 1.03 
Kazakh SSR 117 1.34 
Small Tributaries (0.3) – 
Uzbek SSR 33.6 0.3 
Tajik SSR 30.5 0.23 
Artur Arys (1.2) – Kazakh SSR 200 – 
Downstream Main stem Chardara:TS-5.7; AS-4.7 Kazakh SSR 374 – 
The implication of looking at irrigation districts rather than the whole basin is that local water 
insecurity becomes more visible. Hence, after independence, irrigation districts were most water 
insecure if they were either dependent on one transboundary source only or if they were dependent on 
one transboundary infrastructure for capturing winter flows. Looking at the largest irrigator within the 
irrigation district only, the most potentially water insecure irrigation district would be Mid-stream.  
Here, the largest benefiter of the Mid-stream Kayrakum Reservoir is Uzbekistan; however, the 
reservoir is controlled by Tajikistan. In the case of the Ferghana Valley, although the main benefiter is 
Uzbekistan and the main reservoir is controlled by Kyrgyzstan, having access to alternative sources 
(Karadarya and small tributaries) as well as smaller reservoirs (Andijan as well as on small tributaries) 
could be interpreted as being in a less water insecure situation. 
However, Table 1 also reveals that some irrigation districts are transboundary. Hence, within irrigation 
districts there is a second layer of potential water insecurity for transboundary parties. Within the Ferghana 
Valley irrigation district some areas experienced more potential water insecurity than others. These 
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potential insecurities are not related to the shift of Toktogul reservoir operation but more due to smaller 
transboundary infrastructure. Examples of these smaller infrastructures are the Big Namangan Canal, 
which is mainly supplying farmers in Uzbekistan. The diversion structure for the canal is located in 
Kyrgyzstan. In addition, within the Ferghana Valley and within smaller tributary basins downstream Uzbek 
areas are potentially water insecure, such as in the Isfara tributary [15]. Irrigated areas within Tajikistan are 
potentially water insecure if they depend on transboundary infrastructure, for example Tajikistan is at the 
tail-end of the Big Ferghana and North Ferghana Canals [15]. Although Kyrgyzstan is mainly upstream 
from the Ferghana valley, areas in Kyrgyzstan receive water through pump stations located in Uzbek 
territory or diversion from transboundary main canals, such as the South Ferghana Canal [14]. 
Within the mid-stream irrigation district, the Dustlik canal is transboundary and shared between 
Uzbekistan at the head-end and Kazakhstan at the tail-end [79,80]. Within the Dustlik canal 
Uzbekistan irrigates 98 thousand ha and Kazakhstan 125 thousand ha. Wegerich [86], comparing data 
from the years 1990 and 1991 with the years 2004 and 2005, shows that after independence 
Kazakhstan received less water and later during the cultivation period. Hence, for Kazakhstan along 
the Dustlik canal not the operation of Kayrakum reservoir appears to be the main factor, but the 
withdrawals along the Dustlik canal within Uzbekistan. 
The Chakir irrigation district is independent of the operation of the Toktogul reservoir and is mainly 
based on water of tributaries, with only small diversion through lift from the Syr Darya to Uzbekistan 
(Dalverzin canal’s command area) [87]. Within the irrigation district, Uzbekistan transfers water 
through three canals (Zakh, Khanym, and Big Keles) from the Chirchik river to the Keles massif 
irrigation system in Kazakhstan irrigating about 66 thousand ha [88], the same canals return water to 
Uzbekistan to irrigate about 17 thousand ha in Tashkent and Kibray districts [89]. Dukhovny et al. [88] 
report variation of water supplied to Kazakhstan. In the period 1995–2003 water supply varied 
between 347 and 595 km3/year. It is not evident whether the mentioned 89 thousand ha [84] in 
Kazakhstan are all within the Keles massif and that therefore a major reduction of water supply 
occurred after independence. The major reduction could either be caused by a reduced total flow, or 
again as in the case of the Dustlik canal by withdrawals along the three main canals within Uzbekistan. 
Overall, the irrigation district which was most water insecure after independence was dependent on one 
transboundary source (the main stem of the Syr Darya) and one transboundary infrastructure (reservoir). 
Similarly, areas within irrigation districts which were most water insecure to water supply shortages were 
dependent on transboundary infrastructure (main canals, pump stations) and had access to one 
transboundary water source (small transboundary tributary (STT) or main stem of the Syr Darya). The 
irrigation district which is the most water insecure is Mid-stream, and the areas being most water insecure 
within irrigation districts are some Uzbek and Tajik areas within the Ferghana Valley, Kazakh areas within 
the Mid-stream, and Kazakh as well as minor Uzbek areas within the Chakir irrigation districts. 
4. Past and Current Water Security Approaches: Capturing Winter Flow and Alternative Sources 
4.1. Past Water Security Approaches–Example the Ferghana Valley Irrigation District 
Looking particularly at the Ferghana Valley, in the past, different strategies have been used to 
facilitate adaptation to seasonal fluctuations. Early on, Soviet Engineers started linking the main 
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tributaries with smaller tributaries of the Syr Darya through main canals [90–92]. Later on, water security 
was increased through the construction of small reservoirs for capturing winter flows of tributaries [16,17]. 
Finally, with the increase of irrigated areas in small tributaries within upstream Kyrgyzstan, pump 
stations were constructed to lift water from main canals towards small tributaries [15,93]. Hence, 
within the Ferghana Valley, a meshed system was constructed which allowed switching from the main 
water source to an alternative water source and winter flow on tributaries as well as main stem was 
captured. Therefore, water security within the Ferghana Valley was achieved through tapping from 
alternative water sources through additional infrastructure (duplication) and storing winter flow. 
4.2. Current Water Security Approaches 
After independence from the Soviet Union, whenever possible, all states tried and are still trying to 
find solutions for becoming independent from each other. These solutions are based on capturing 
current unused winter flow or through duplication of access infrastructure for the exploration of 
alternative water sources. Dukhovny [94] highlights that “Uzbekistan is striving for almost full 
satisfaction of its demand for additional water through releases from the Andijan reservoir and, 
partially, through construction of in-stream reservoirs”. 
Within the Ferghana Valley irrigation district, Uzbekistan constructed the Rezaksay reservoir  
(0.3 km3) between the North Ferghana and the Big Namangan Canals and the Markaziy (Central) 
reservoir (0.35 km3) along the Big Andijan Canal to store unused winter flow of Toktogul. Different 
riparian states are also trying to attempt water security through duplication of access infrastructure and 
shifting to alternative sources. Uzbekistan plans additional pump stations from the North Ferghana to 
the Big Namangan Canal to compensate for the inoperative diversion structure for the Big Namangan 
Canal in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, Uzbekistan plans new pump stations for utilizing ground water in the 
Ferghana province, here the aim is to compensate for less water received along smaller tributaries  
(key informant from BVO Syr Darya, January 2014). Still within the Ferghana Valley irrigation 
district, Tajikistan first started to negotiate water allocation issues regarding Big Ferghana Canal with 
Uzbekistan through issue linkages with the Kayrakum reservoir. More recently, Tajikistan started to divert 
water from the Isfara tributary directly into the tail-end part of the Big Ferghana Canal which is within its 
territory. Hence, although water allocations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were negotiated, Tajikistan 
was still not able to receive its water share on the Big Ferghana Canal. As consequence of the recent Tajik 
strategy, Uzbekistan’s irrigated areas in the downstream Isfara tributary became more water insecure [15]. 
In the late 1990s, within the Midstream irrigation district, Uzbekistan anticipated to use the flood 
spills towards Arnasai Lake for irrigation [82,95]. Hence, Uzbekistan anticipated to making use of an 
existing “reservoir” to facilitate alternative water supply or duplication to existing canal infrastructure. 
More recently, Uzbekistan started to construct the Sardova reservoir (1.0 km3) along the South 
Golodnyesteppe canal (key informant from BVO Syr Darya, January 2014). The reservoir will enable 
Uzbekistan to secure winter flow below the Kayrakum reservoir. Within the Downstream irrigation 
district, Kazakhstan built the Koksarai reservoir (3.0 km3) below Chardara, and has planned two 
additional reservoirs for flood protection and to store unused winter flow (Figure 3). Regarding alternative 
water supply and duplication, Kazakhstan made use of its existing Chardara reservoir and constructed 
pump-stations towards the Dustlik canal to reduce its dependence on transboundary infrastructure. 
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So far, no alternative sources or duplication seem to be anticipated for the Kazakh part of the Chakir 
irrigation district. However, Dukhovny et al. [88] mentions that Kazakhstan is planning the expansion 
of its irrigated area to 98 thousand ha, with a total withdrawal of 1140 Mm3/year. To secure the 
additional water needs Kazakhstan might consider a similar approach as taken in the Mid-stream and 
Downstream irrigation districts and might attempt to reduce dependence on transboundary 
infrastructure. The potential source, could be the Chirchik directly, since, 0.75 km3/year of its flow 
generation is within Kazakhstan [58]. 
 
Figure 3. New reservoirs in the Syr Darya. (Source: Based on information compiled 
through GIS maps, as well as key informer BVO Syr Darya). 
4.3. Short Discussion: Downstream Countries Increasing their Indirect Water Security 
The two downstream riparian states, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which were negatively affected by 
the operation of Toktogul within irrigation districts which depended to a larger extent on the main stem 
(Ferghana Valley, Midstream and Downstream) developed similar strategies regarding water security. 
Both are creating water storage within their territories for not having to depend on the Toktogul or 
Kayrakum reservoirs operation. With the creation of additional storage, the basin’s downstream 
riparian states avoid having to negotiate summer operations and therefore paying for electricity from  
Toktogul. Within the Downstream irrigation district the reservoir has multiple functions; storing winter 
flows for flood mitigation and securing irrigation needs during the summer. However, water to the 
Koksarai reservoir has to be pumped. Overall, the creation of capacity to store winter flow not only 
reduces the dependence on other riparian states, but also decreased the bargaining power of upstream 
states. Given that off-season flows were already allocated within the closed Syr Darya basin, the 
creation of national storage, particularly in the midstream country Uzbekistan, might off-set the 
Water 2015, 7 4668 
 
 
existing but not anymore operationalized riparian states allocations to downstream states. In addition, 
the additional storage within the midstream and downstream countries (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) 
might put into question the water delivery to the Northern Aral Sea in Kazakhstan. 
The creation of access to alternative water resources such as groundwater resources within the 
Uzbek part or the diversion of the transboundary tributary (Isfara) within the Tajik part of the Ferghana 
Valley irrigation district highlights the dividing up of the transboundary irrigation district according to 
national boundaries. Similarly, the creation of a pump station along the Chardara reservoir for 
supplying the Kazakh part of the Dustlik canal highlights the merging of parts of the former Midstream 
and Downstream irrigation districts along national boundaries. Hence, the identified water security 
solutions rely on national water security solutions, rather than on transboundary solutions. The 
implication is that although pumping costs such as on the Chardara might be economically higher, and 
the diversion of the STT might be more unstable due to seasonality, these solutions might provide 
more stability and reliability compared to the past transboundary water supply solutions. 
Overall, these new water security solutions for water shortages are building on past security 
approaches practiced within Soviet Central Asia. However, these new solutions focus primary on 
national water security. While these are technical solutions to water shortages, it is questionable 
whether the water bureaucracy can safeguard the availability of water resources for their users. 
5. Surveillance and Guards–Irrigation Bureaucracy (Example Ferghana Province) 
While the previous section focused on poly-centers within the basin and on more passive security 
measures, here the focus turns to the meso-level, the Ferghana Province, and direct security measures, 
such as water metering devices, surveillance and guards. As mentioned in the introduction, here a 
historic approach is taken by looking at long term trends [96] (1978 to 2010) of the water supply 
control side of the irrigation department of Ferghana Province. Therefore it is first necessary to 
highlight the changes on the demand side during the Soviet period and after independence. 
5.1. Geographic Background to Ferghana Province 
Ferghana Province is located within the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley. The province occupies  
6800 km2 and consists of fifteen districts, four major cities and has a total population of about three million. 
The province borders Kyrgyzstan to the south-east, Tajikistan to its western side and two Uzbek provinces 
Andijan and Namangan to the east and north respectively. The province has access to different water 
sources, the Syr Darya, the Big Ferghana Canal (BFC)-diverting water from the Naryn (controlled by 
Toktogul reservoir in upstream Kyrgyzstan), Karadarya (controlled by Andijan Reservoir operated by 
Uzbekistan), the South Ferghana Canal (SFC) (taking water directly from the Andijan Reservoir) and the 
Big Andijan Canal (BAC) (also diverting water from the Naryn), as well as five Smaller Transboundary 
Tributaries (STTs): Kuvasai, Isfayramsai, Shakhirmadansai, Sokh and Isfara (from east to west), which all, 
with the exception of the Kuvasai, intersect with either the SFC or BFC [14]. On all main canals and small 
tributaries Ferghana Province is at the tail-end. With independence, the water situation for Ferghana 
Province was aggravated on the main canals BFC and BAC as well as some STTs (Figure 4). 
Before independence, within Ferghana Province the irrigated area increased from 285,000 ha in 
1969 up to 368,300 ha in 1988. After independence in 1991, the irrigated area first declined, but 
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stabilized at about 361,000 ha from 2006 onwards. According to Bucknall et al. [97] about one third of the 
irrigated area in the province, 115,000 ha, is supplied via pumps and pump stations (lift). Recently 
Wegerich et al. [93] showed that 151,000 ha are supplied via pump stations and of these 69,000 ha have a 
lift of over 50 meters. About one third of these pump stations can be classified as transboundary pump 
stations, which were constructed to mitigate upstream expansion in transboundary tributaries [93]. 
 
Figure 4. Total water received and utilized in Ferghana Province from 1991 to 2009 
(deviation from 1991), (Source: compiled from data of the irrigation department of 
Ferghana Province). 
5.2. Demand Side Changes-Farming Units and Crops 
During the Soviet period, agricultural production was organized in crop specialized state owned 
large scale collective farms, varying in sizes between 2000 and 8000 ha. Within Ferghana Province 
were a total of 120 collective farms in 1975, which changed to 162 by 1991. During the 1990s, 
collective farms were transformed into semi-cooperative farms, with an average size of 2000 to 3000 ha. 
Within Ferghana Province a total of 164 semi-cooperative farms were registered. Although already in 1992 
the law on peasant farms [98] (peasant/dehkan farms) was issued, privatization did not kick off until 2001, 
based on a new law concerning farms in 1998 [99]. Within the province, the number of private farms rose 
from about 3000 in 2000 to below 26,000 in 2007. In 2009, a Presidential Decree [100] on farm 
optimization was issued, which led to decrease in the number of private farms. Already prior to the 
Presidential Decree [100], the number of private farms dropped again in Ferghana Province. The total 
number was below 12,000 in 2010 (Figure 5). 
Usually, when reference is made to the Uzbek SSR and its agricultural production during the Soviet 
period, cotton monoculture and alfalfa are mentioned. It is also argued that because of state planning the 
Uzbek SSR increased its irrigated area for further expanding its cotton monoculture [91,101]. The data of 
Ferghana Province shows that from 1978 the increases of irrigated area did not lead to an increase of the 
area under cotton cultivation, the area under cotton even decreased. According to Anderson [102] after the 
cotton scandal in the 1980s and to soften the social conditions the Uzbek SSR Leader (Nishonov) asked 
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permission to reduce the cotton quota for Uzbekistan. Consequently, the area under cotton decreased 
further in the Ferghana Province from 196,000 ha (56 percent) in 1987 to 164,000 (46 percent) in 1990. 
 
Figure 5. Dynamics of private farms in Ferghana Province 2000–2010 (total numbers). 
5.3. Current Water Security Approaches Focusing on the Demand Side 
After independence, Uzbekistan shifted to a policy of food self-sufficiency and therefore expanded 
the area under wheat cultivation. Although usually emphasized as food security policy, one could 
argue that the food security policy was in fact a water security policy. Within Ferghana Province 
winter wheat was grown from 1995 onwards. In the period from 1995 to 2010, the area allocated to 
cotton decreased from 36% to about 30% and the area allocated to winter wheat increased from 0% in 
1994 to 31% in 2010 (Figure 6). Within Ferghana Province, winter wheat has mainly replaced alfalfa. 
Although winter wheat would imply less water demand during the summer season, farmers utilize the 
period between harvest and sowing to grow a second crop [103,104]. Recent studies have shown that 
the ratio of second crops after winter wheat is between 60% and 80% within Ferghana province [105]. 
Given the large ratio of second crops the potential for water savings is reduced (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 6. Changes of cropping patters 1978 to 2010 (1,000 ha). 
Water 2015, 7 4671 
 
 
Being concerned about the fragmentation of former collective farms and based on international 
recommendations, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan approved the Procedure for 
organizing Water User Associations (WUAs) in 2002 [106]. Within Ferghana Province, the Integrated 
Water Resources Management project, funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC), established WUAs along the SFC and Shakhirmadansai STT. By 2011, Ferghana Province had 
119 WUAs. WUAs have been mainly established on the territory of the former semi-cooperative farms  
(with the exception in the donor funded project). Because of the difference in numbers, it is not evident 
whether the process of creating WUAs was completed within the province. WUAs are newly created 
organizations and therefore it is questionable whether they can plan and allocate water according to 
requests of farmers and available water resources supplied by the irrigation department. 
 
Figure 7. Irrigation norms and trends of water demand during summer season 1978 to 
2010 (m3). 
5.4. Current Water Security Approaches Focusing on the Supply Side 
There were few projects that focused on the water supply organizations (irrigation departments).  
A SDC funded project, focusing on main canal management, brought governance issues forward and 
therefore established a “union of canal water users” along the SFC (2002 to 2012), with less emphasis 
on infrastructure or finance which was demanded by the irrigation department [33]. An additional SDC 
project focused on main canal automation along the SFC (2005 to 2010). Towards the end of the main 
canal automation project key problems were raised regarding sustainability of operation and 
maintenance as well as capacity of irrigation departments’ operating staff [107]. A Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) project (2009 to 2011) focused on GIS capacity 
building of water supply organizations and on creating transparency of water flow information [108]. 
However, also here, long term sustainability was voiced regarding staff issues. Given the early start of 
these different projects, one has to note that when the first SDC project started in 2002, there were no 
international publications on the irrigation departments in Central Asia, except some donor reports. 
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5.5. Supply Side Changes—The Irrigation Bureaucracy 
According to Dukhovny and de Schuetter [101] “the beginning of the 1980s saw the first signs that 
governments were paying attention to the problems of managing the large river basins  
(Amu Darya and Syr Darya) in Central Asia”. During the 1980–1985 period “more than 70 rubles  
(US$ 45 in 1980, which converts to US$ 137 buying power in 2014) per irrigated hectare were 
annually allocated to water management organizations. Accordingly fixed assets at the inter-farm level 
increased by 36%, the number of service staff at the inter-farm level increased by 20%, the number of 
inter-farm irrigation networks equipped with water-measuring structures increased by 93% and  
water-distributing structures increased by 94%” [101]. After independence, the situation changed. 
Thurman [109] highlighted limiting factors of the irrigation departments for controlling water supply 
to the users, “very low salaries, small operational budgets, and very little equipment”.  
Wegerich [110,111] looking at staffing and logistics of the irrigation department of Khorezm province 
argued that the past procedure of controlling off-takes from main canals was not anymore possible. 
Other studies have highlighted that the 1997 merger between the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Ministry of Water Resources, led to a downgrading of the Water Ministry as merely dependent 
department [70,111–115]. 
5.6. Case Study the Ferghana Province Irrigation Department 
At the time of basin closure in the beginning of the 1980s, the Ferghana Province Irrigation 
Department controlled water supply through hydroposts (measuring infrastructure within main canal 
and at off-take level) and flexible guarding (motor bikes and staff) (Figure 8). The long-term trend up 
to 1997 shows that the number of staff of the irrigation department was set on expansion. This is 
similar to the trend with the number of hydroposts, showing a rapid increase from the mid-1980s to 
1990, and a slowing increase up to 1997. Flexible guarding through motor bikes expanded rapidly in 
1983 and 1984, and stabilized at a lower level in 1987. However, after independence in 1991, motor 
bikes were not mentioned anywhere within the annual reports of the irrigation department. 
 
Figure 8. Dynamics of supply side control-surveillance and guards in Ferghana Province 
(total numbers). 
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While the most staff increases of the irrigation department can be attributed to the construction of 
pump stations during the 1980s [93], the rapid fall of staff numbers in 1988 to 89 and 1992 to 93 
appear to be due to wider social, nationalistic and economic changes[116–118]. In 1997 the Ministry 
of Water Resources merged with the Ministry of Agriculture 1997 marks the turning point for trigging 
a downward trend regarding staffing as well as hydroposts. In 2003, a main canal dispatch center was 
created in Ferghana Valley, which as consequence had a reduction of the number of staff as well as the 
reported number of hydroposts under the Ferghana Province Irrigation Department. 
As mentioned before, there has been a major increase of operation and maintenance from 1980s 
onwards [101]. Until 1985, expenditure on operation and maintenance appears to have been nearly 
stable with rapid increases during the period from 1986 to 1990 (Figure 9). Hence, it appears that the 
Soviet Union put high emphasis on water supply security and control of water supply. During the 
economic crisis which followed independence, the operation and maintenance expenditure decreased 
rapidly, and regained the level of 1986 only by 1996. However, with the merger between the two 
Ministries operation and maintenance as well as rehabilitation expenditure declined to insignificance. 
Although from 1996 onwards the Uzbek Gross Domestic Product (GDP) started to increase again [119], 
this increase has not triggered a reinvestment in the Ferghana Province Irrigation Department. 
 
Figure 9. Expenditure for Operation and Maintenance and Rehabilitation (in 1,000 Soviet 
Union Rubles for the period 1978–1991 and 1,000 Uzbek Sums for the period 1995–2010, 
the secondary axis is in 1,000 USD buying power as of 2014). 
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The disappearance of motor bikes and the increasing total number of staff and hydroposts could 
suggest that there was a shift from flexible to static (staff being posted at the hydroposts directly) water 
supply control after independence up to 1997. However, the declined salary level combined with an 
overall rising staff number suggest that full-time employment within the irrigation department might 
not have guaranteed livelihood security. Kandiyoti mentions that often employees were only formally 
employed but in fact did not receive salaries [120]. Therefore, it is questionable whether after 
independence surveillance and guarding continued. Similarly, the decreasing expenditure on 
maintenance after independence suggests that the number of functioning hydroposts has declined, but 
that dysfunctional hydroposts are still recorded.  
5.7. Short Discussion: Losing Direct Water Security 
During the time of the Soviet Union, rising water demands (due to expansion as well as change in 
cropping patterns) triggered an adaptation process of the irrigation department. During this period 
there was an increase of water supply control noticeable with the increasing numbers of staff, 
hydroposts and motorbikes. More funding was allocated to operation and maintenance as well as 
rehabilitation of water supply infrastructure. After independence water demand continued to increase; 
however this was not anymore matched with increases in water supply or an increased water supply 
security. Therefore, there appears to be an apparent mismatch between official figures of water supplied 
and evidence of water utilized. 
An adaptation process for the new situation came only in 1995 with the introduction of winter 
wheat and therefore an assumed reduction of overall water demand. The adaptation of crops cannot 
only be interpreted as a response to a decrease of water supply, but possibly also as a political attempt 
to avoid strengthening the organizational capacity of the irrigation department, through increases of 
finances and logistics. In this respect, the merger between the two ministries, which followed the 
introduction of winter wheat, could be interpreted not only in terms of budget savings, but also that the 
solution for water supply insecurity was seen through controlling agriculture rather than water supply. 
However, given that about 60% to 80% of winter wheat area is utilized for second crops, this attempt 
did not reduce the need for water supply security solutions but aggravated the situation further, since 
the second crop diversity demands more irregular irrigation compared to mono cropping of cotton. The 
merger triggered further budget and staff cuts within the irrigation department and therefore the water 
supply security was lost completely. With the implementation of land reforms, the need for water 
supply security would have increased significantly. However, there is no evidence that water supply 
security has been strengthened. 
Looking at past projects (SDC and GIZ) it is evident that the first focus on governance through  
“union of canal water users” was misplaced, since water supply security was not possible. Looking at 
the total operation and maintenance budget of the irrigation department, it is also evident that canal 
automation would have added an additional burden, which was unlikely to be sustainable. Looking at 
the salary of irrigation department staff, it is also evident that staff after having gained additional 
knowledge would look for other job opportunities. Therefore, unfortunately, these projects appear to 
have been too ambitious and possibly too premature, assuming that the irrigation department would 
have an existing capacity of supply security. It appears that these projects focused on a piecemeal 
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approach, omitting key questions of capacity, and mainly not considering that irrigation departments 
are government organizations, and the potential of donor influence on these established bureaucracies 
could be limited if it is single focused and project based. 
Given the deteriorating position of funding and therefore capacity of the irrigation department to control 
and the negative aspects for its staff, regarding salary, it is evident that the diversity and power inequities of 
WUAs along main canals might increase. Given the lack of capacity to control, it is likely that the foremost 
rising inequity will be based on the location along main canals. In addition, Platonov et al [105] have 
highlighted that within Ferghana Valley the inequity depends also on the off-take infrastructure.  
The implication is, that irrigated area which rely on more costly infrastructure (such as pump stations), 
which are operated and maintained by the irrigation department, are less likely to be able to produce 
profitable second crops. In addition, there is already evidence, that the lack of control on the main 
canal level has negative effects and has increased power disparities within WUAs. Mukhamedova and 
Wegerich [45] highlight how water scarcities are inequitably distributed within WUAs and affecting 
mainly the most vulnerable part of the communities, kitchen gardens in villages. 
Although this second section only presented the case of the Uzbek Ferghana Province, it is assumed 
that Ferghana Province is not only representative regarding its budget limitations for Uzbekistan, but 
also for other riparian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). However, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan compared to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are late implementers of land reforms as well as 
lifting slowly the restrictions on agricultural production. Therefore, in Uzbekistan, agricultural water 
demand and the subsequent need for increasing water supply has likely expanded more slowly 
compared to its neighboring countries. 
6. Discussion Linking Irrigation District to Meso-Level Water Security 
The first section demonstrated that after independence in 1991, water supply security was high on 
the agenda with building resilience through additional or alternative water supply sources  
(from existing national reservoirs, groundwater sources, or small transboundary tributaries) as well as 
duplication of or less reliance on critical infrastructure (through the construction of smaller reservoirs 
within the country, pump-stations or diversion canals for small transboundary rivers). The second 
section showed for the Uzbek Ferghana Province that less attention was paid to surveillance and 
guards in the irrigation schemes, and that consequently the irrigation department lost its capacity to 
secure water supply to the water users. Hence, water supply security appears to focus on technical 
solutions (new infrastructure), while old and deteriorating infrastructure as well as operational 
sustainability of the water departments are neglected. Possibly, the focus on capturing more water and 
setting up additional supply lines might postpone the strengthening of existing organizations. 
Consequently, the chosen approach might secure more water resources, but possibly will not lead to 
more equitable water distribution within irrigation systems. Furthermore, there appears to be little 
reflection of the government on past infrastructure strategies and subsequent consequences for the 
irrigation departments. The past strategy on duplication (switching sources through the construction of 
pump stations) proved to be very costly and financially unsustainable for the Ferghana Province 
irrigation department [93]. Although these strategies could imply more water security through 
avoidance of transboundary dependence, the short and long term financial sustainability is questionable. 
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Although these strategies increase national water security they also increase the energy demand for 
supporting irrigated agriculture. Therefore these strategies move the water-energy nexus from the basin 
to the national or provincial level. 
The different water security approaches after independence were: (1) introduction of winter wheat 
in 1995 (adjusting demand); (2) creation of WUAs in 2002 (direct security approach at the local level)  
and (3) infrastructure projects starting by 2010 (indirect security approach at the meso-level). None of 
these initiatives directly addressed the main water supply organizations. Hence, there was no direct 
security approach at the meso-level. It is likely that this was a conscious decision. Possibly for 
Uzbekistan the merger between the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture 
decreased the focus on water supply organizations. A direct security approach would have increased 
the potential power of the former Water Resources Ministry. However, since globally public irrigation 
management is viewed negatively and as having failed [26], it is likely that also from the donor side 
strengthening the irrigation departments was off the agenda. At least, looking at Kyrgyzstan, the donor 
community attempted to circumvent irrigation departments by establishing top-down “bottom-up” 
WUA federations for replacing irrigation departments (as in the case of World Bank projects) [121]. 
Nevertheless, it is not evident, how WUA federations would be able to take over managerial 
responsibility or would have the capacities to cover operation and maintenance costs, especially 
looking at the high past expenditures of the Ferghana Province Irrigation Department. 
7. Conclusions 
So far, neither polycentric water management nor water supply organizations (irrigation 
departments) have received broad international attention within the Syr Darya Basin. Instead, so far the 
main focus has been on the creation of WUAs at the local level and basin management at the 
international level. The implication is that there is a widening gap regarding promoted and actual water 
security approaches as well as a missing link, which in the past have been the province irrigation 
departments. Hence, by looking at meso-level water security (“irrigation districts” as well as irrigation 
departments) the paper has attempted to close an important gap of the current water security focus in 
the Syr Darya Basin. 
Irrigation departments are negatively viewed as public sector organizations, and are perceived as 
having failed to adapt to wider socio-political or environmental changes [26]. However, the long term 
data on the Ferghana Province highlighted that the irrigation department was capable of adapting by 
increasing staffing and mobility as well as creating resilience through new infrastructure during the 
Soviet period. Only after independence and due to the economic crisis, the administrative changes 
(merger between the two Ministries) and possibly the exposure to the global “neo-liberal” donor 
community focusing on water user governance, led to the decline of the irrigation department’s 
capacity. There is great potential for the current discourse on water security and the water, energy and 
food nexus to refocus attention to the challenges of existing water supply organizations. However, at 
least based on suggestions from some of the global literature [4,6], the essential element of water 
supply security, have been either taken for granted or overlooked. Similar, although Sadoff et al. [28] puts 
key emphasis on water supply organizations, the mentioned “institutional tripod” (water users, states and 
markets) might imply an emphasis on governance, without strengthening the capacity of the water supply 
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organizations first. The findings of the case study demonstrated the loss of technical and organizational 
water control and therefore the loss of the capacity of the irrigation department. The implication of not 
strengthening the water supply organizations are already evident; increased inequality of water distribution 
along the main canals, which negatively affects water distribution within WUAs. Given the already 
identified weaknesses of governance due to the diversity and power inequities of users, these inequities 
could further increase. 
As indicated by our analysis the weakest link for water security is the public administrations, it is 
therefore essential to finally engage with the water bureaucracy. This calls for a comprehensive 
analysis regarding past and current internal as well as external challenges for the water bureaucracy for 
enabling its revitalization on key water security challenges. This call for revitalizing the water 
bureaucracy challenges the neo-liberal paradigm. Given that the bureaucracy is a public 
administration, a revitalization will not be possible in a piecemeal approach of donor sponsored 
“projects” (like the SDC and GIZ project mentioned in the case study) but instead calls for a long-term 
approach for reinvestment and modernization and therefore strengthening the public administration. 
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